Abstract: A hash function secure in the indifferentiability framework (TCC 2004) is able to resist all meaningful generic attacks. Such hash functions also play a crucial role in establishing the security of protocols that use them as random functions. To eliminate multi-collision type attacks on the Merkle-Damgård mode (Crypto 1989), Lucks proposed widening the size of the internal state of hash functions (Asiacrypt 2005). The fast wide pipe (FWP) hash mode was introduced by Nandi and Paul at Indocrypt 2010, as a faster variant of Lucks' wide pipe mode. Despite the higher speed, the proven indifferentiability bound of the FWP mode has so far been only up to the birthday barrier of n/ bits. The main result of this paper is the improvement of the FWP bound to n/ bits (up to an additive constant). We also provide evidence that the bound may be extended beyond n/ bits.
Our contribution
The FWP mode (2010). The fast wide pipe (FWP) hash mode was proposed by Nandi and Paul in 2010 [28] , as a faster variant of the wide pipe (WP) mode [24] (see Figure 1) . The key idea used in FWP is that only half of the chaining value -instead of the full chaining value -is used as input into the primitive C, while the other half is XOR-ed into the output. Thus, FWP increases the rate by allowing message blocks larger than those used by the WP mode. See Figure 2 which compares the WP mode with the FWP mode. As is the case 1. WP, chopMD [12, 15] n 0 0 ro 2. JH [27] n n 0.5 n/ n( − ε) ip 3. Grøstl [18] n n 0.5 n/ n ip 4. Sponge [7] n n 0.5 n/ n/ ip 5. Parazoa [4] n n 0.5 up to n/ n ip 6. FWP (this paper) n n 0.5 n/ n ro 7. Shabal [11] n n 0.25 n n ic 8. BLAKE [2, 13] n n 0.5 n/ n/ ic 9. FWP (this paper) n n . n/ n ro 10. WP, chop MD [12, 15] t + n t t/(t + n) n n ro 11. FWP (this paper) t + n t + n (t + n)/(t + n) n/ n ro Table 1 . Indifferentiability security bounds (upper and lower) for several wide-pipe hash modes, where the primitive output is n-bit (the hash size is n-bit). The primitives ro, ic and ip are shorthand for random oracle, ideal cipher, and ideal permutation. The letter t denotes a positive integer. The ε is a small fraction due to the preimage attack on JH presented in [8] . with all other high rate hash modes with primitive output n bits, the indifferentiability bound of FWP has so far remained only up to n/ bits [28] .
The difficulty of breaking the birthday barrier. It is apparent from Table 1 that extending both the rate and the indifferentiability bound of a hash mode is a challenging task. Note that the Shabal and wide pipe modes have n-bit security bounds, but their rates are quite low. For the Sponge function -though having a high rate of 0.5 -the security bound is n/ -bit, which cannot be improved further, since there is a preimage attack with work approximately n/ ; see [6] .
Several other designs (JH (2007), Grøstl (2007) , FWP (2010) and the Parazoa family (2011)) have shown promise. Each achieves the high rate of . (if a = n then the FWP can achieve a rate of . ), and their indifferentiability bounds can potentially be improved beyond the birthday barrier. Despite several attempts, so far none of them has been shown to have the beyond-birthday-barrier security; see [3, 8, 27, 28] .
In all of the previous attempts, the basic approach for proving indifferentiability security has been more or less the same. First, a suitable compression function is constructed around the primitive C. See, for example, the compression function contained in the shaded part of Figure 1 . Then a set of events are identified that primarily consider collisions on n (out of n) bits of output of the compression function. These events are typically called BAD events, and are used to differentiate between pairs of games. Lastly, using some sophisticated combinatorial tricks and counting techniques, the total probability of the BAD events is computed by summing them across all rounds and messages.
In the above framework, an important requirement to improving the security bound consists in a clever selection of the BAD events with the following two properties: (1) BAD events should occur with "low" probabilities; (2) the number of newly generated messages (more technically reconstructible messages as defined later) is also "low" in absence of the BAD events.
It turns out that attaining the above two properties is a challenge. To keep the number of reconstructible messages low at O( ), a direct approach, as mentioned before, is to design BAD events to be collisions on n (out of 2n) output bits of the compression function; however, such collisions occur with "high" probabilities, resulting in a security bound of only n/ bits. On the other hand, we could consider collisions on the entire n output bits as BAD events. Although these collisions occur with "low" probabilities, they produce O(i ) reconstructible messages after i queries, which would again only lead to an overall security lower bound of n/ bits.
Evidently to go beyond the n/ -bit security bound, we need to identify BAD events whose probability of occurrence will be as low as the probability of random n-bit collisions (rather than of n-bit collisions). We also need that the number of all reconstructible messages after i queries will be linear in i, rather than quadratic.
The main result. Our main result is the improvement of the indifferentiability security bound for the FWP mode from n/ to n/ bits (up to a constant factor). The FWP mode is based on a primitive of the form C : { , } a → { , } n , and our n/ -bit security bound is valid for all a ≥ n. We make two important observations.
Let ℍ(a, b, r) denote the class of all rate r, n-bit hash functions with a primitive of the form C : { , } a → { , } b . The FWP mode is the only known hash mode with the beyond-birthday-barrier security in the important class ℍ( n, n, . ). Compare FWP with JH, Grøstl, Sponge, and the Parazoa family. This essentially settles a longstanding open problem.
LetH(a, b) denote the class of all n-bit hash functions with the beyond-birthday-barrier security based upon primitives of the form C : { , } a → { , } b . In the important classH(a, n), the FWP mode achieves the highest rate for all a ≥ n. Compare FWP with chop-MD, Shabal and BLAKE.
The tools. The first new idea used to break the n/ -bit bound is in using certain 3-multi-collisions on n bits -in addition to collisions on n bits -as potential BAD events. We show that the 3-multi-collisions on n bits as well as the n-bit collisions both occur with low probabilities. In particular, we carefully design a set of sixteen BAD events defined on the query, primitive and compression function outputs.
The second trick is to split the above n-bit collisions into two distinct n-bit collisions occurring in two different phases at the time of updating the simulator's graph (technically we shall call it a reconstruction graph). Updating the reconstruction graph -whose branches represent messages built from the queries and their responses -in a sequence of two phases, rather than just one, is crucial to the results in this work.
Using these two techniques, we are able to overcome the aforementioned obstacles in moving beyond the n/ -bit bound. In particular, the absence of the BAD events allows the reconstruction graph to grow for a maximum of two phases every round, while restricting the number of newly added nodes in the graphs to a constant number. As a result, we have O(i) reconstructible messages after i rounds, and at the same time, the probability of occurrence of the BAD events remains low. Once these important requirements are fulfilled, the final step is to prove an isomorphism of graphs, which then directly implies the claimed bound.
Beyond the n/ -bit barrier. It seems likely that the n/ -bit bound of FWP could be further improved, if we switched from two phases to a three-phase framework. We experimented with a slightly different set of BAD events in the three-(or more) phase framework. The results provide ample evidence that the indifferentiability bound for the FWP mode can be stretched closer to n bits. We leave it as an open problem to complete the theoretical analysis required for such an improved bound.
Warning.
As is necessary for any analysis of cryptosystems based on ideal objects, we caution the reader that the security guarantee of n/ bits for any practical hash function, based on the FWP mode, can only be achieved as long as the underlying concrete primitive is free from all structural weaknesses, see [32] .
Preliminaries

Notation and convention
Throughout the paper we let n be a fixed integer. While representing a bit-string, we follow the convention of low-bit first (or little-endian bit ordering). For concatenation of strings, we use a‖b, or just ab if the meaning is clear. The symbol ⟨n⟩ m denotes the m-bit encoding of n. The symbol |x| denotes the bit-length of the bit-string x, or sometimes the size of the set x. Let x
We write A B to denote an algorithm A with oracle access to B. Let 
Description of FWP mode
We now revisit the description of the FWP mode of [28] . Suppose that ℓ and n are integers such that ℓ ≥ n ≥ . Let C : { , } ℓ+n → { , } n be a cryptographic primitive which we use to build the hash function FWP : { , } * → { , } n . The diagram and the description of the FWP transform are given in Figures 1  and 4 , where C is the random oracle ro.
Padding rule. The notation pad(M) = m ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ m k− m k is interpreted as follows: Using an injective function
In addition to the injectivity of pad(⋅), we will also require another property that there exists a function dePad(⋅) that can efficiently compute M, given pad(M). Formally, the function dePad : ⋃ i≥ { , } (i+ )ℓ−n → {⊥} ∪ { , } * computes dePad(pad(M)) = M, for all M ∈ { , } * , and otherwise dePad(⋅) returns ⊥. We note that the padding rules of all practical hash functions have the above properties. An example of pad(⋅), satisfying the above properties, is pad(M) = M‖ ‖ t , where t is the least non-negative integer such that t = (−|M| − mod ℓ) + ℓ − n. Another example can be found in [28] .
Indifferentiability framework
Definition 2.1 (Indifferentiability framework [15] ). An interactive Turing machine (ITM) T with oracle access to an ideal primitive F is said to be (t A , t S , σ, ε)-indifferentiable from an ideal primitive G if there exists a (a) Indifferentiability framework formalized in Definition 2.1.
(b) Schematic diagrams of the security games (described in Section 3) used in the indifferentiability framework for FWP. simulator S such that, for any distinguisher A, the following equation is satisfied:
The simulator S is an ITM which has oracle access to G and runs in time at most t S . The distinguisher A runs in time at most t A . The number of queries used by A is at most σ. Here ε is a real number in [ , ] . See Figure 3a for a pictorial representation. Adv
The significance of the framework is as follows. Suppose, an ideal primitive G is indifferentiable from an algorithm T based on another ideal primitive F. In such a case, any cryptographic system P based on G is as secure as P based on T F (i.e., G replaces T F in P). For a more detailed explanation, we refer the reader to [25] . Some limitations of the indifferentiability framework have recently been discovered in [17] and [30] . They offer a deep insight into the framework; nevertheless, the observations are not known to affect the security of the indifferentiable hash functions in any meaningful way.
An oracle, a system, and a game. An oracle is an algorithm (accessed by another oracle or algorithm) which, given an input as an appropriately defined query, responds with an output. For example, in Figure 3a , T, F, G and S are oracles.
A random oracle is a function RO : X → Y chosen uniformly at random from the set of all |Y| |X| functions that map X to Y. In other words, a function RO : X → Y is a random oracle if and only if, for each x ∈ X, the value of RO(x) is chosen uniformly at random from Y.
A system is a set of oracles (e.g., System 1 = (T, F), System 2 = (G, S) in Figure 3a) . A game is the interaction of a system with an adversary. We refrain from providing a formal definition of a game, since such formalization will not be necessary in our analysis.
Main theorem: Beyond-birthday-barrier security of FWP
Let RO : { , } * → { , } n and ro : { , } ℓ+n → { , } n be two random oracles. Our indifferentiability framework uses three systems G = (FWP, ro), G = (FWP , S ), and G = (RO, S) (see Figure 3b) . The correspondence between the entities of Figures 3a and 3b are as follows: G = RO, T = FWP and F = ro. The description of FWP , S, and S will be provided in Section 5. Now we state our main theorem using Definition 2.1. 
Theorem 3.1 (Main theorem
and K is a fixed constant derived from ε.
In the next few sections, we will prove Theorem 3.1 by breaking it into several components. First, we briefly describe what the theorem means. It says that no adversary with unbounded running time can mount a non-trivial generic attack on the hash function FWP ro using at most K n/ queries. The parameter K is an increasing function in ε, and is constant for all n > , for a fixed ε. To reduce the notation complexity, we compute the indifferentiability bound assuming ε = / , for which, we shall derive K = / . The proof of Theorem 3.1 consists of the following two components (see Definition 2.1): Firstly, we need to construct a simulator S with the worst-case running time t S = O(σ ). This is done in Section 5. Secondly, we need to show that, for any adversary A, with unbounded running time,
assuming ε = / . We will prove (3.1) by splitting the task into three parts.
• At the end of Section 5, we show that
• In Section 6, we will appropriately define a set of events BAD i and GOOD i for G , and establish in Section 7 that
• Finally, we show in Section 9 that
.) Note that (3.1) is easily established by combining (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). In Sections 4 and 5 we describe the systems G , G and G . Using them, we prove (3.2). In Section 6, we define certain 'bad' events in system G , using which in Section 7 we prove (3.3). In Section 8, some combinatorial results are established to finally prove (3.4) in Section 9.
In Section 10, we provide experimental evidence as to why the FWP should have a better security bound than the proven n/ -bit. In Section 11, we conclude, and pose some open questions.
Data structures
The systems G , G , and G have been mentioned in Section 3 (see schematic diagram in Figure 3b ). Their pseudocode is given in Figures 4, 9 , and 5, respectively. In this section we describe several data structures used by these systems.
Oracles. The main component of a system is the set of oracles that receive queries from the adversary. In Figure 3b , any algorithm that receives a query is an oracle. Note that, except the adversary A, each rectangle denotes an oracle.
The systems use a total of six oracles. The oracles FWP, FWP , and RO are mappings from { , } * to { , } n . The oracles S, ro, and S are mappings from { , } ℓ+n to { , } n . Instruction-by-instruction description of these oracles and the used subroutines are provided in the subsequent sections.
Global and local variables. The oracles described above will use several global and local variables. The local variables are re-initialized every new invocation of the system, while the global data structures maintain their states across queries. The tables D l , D s and D ro are global variables initialized with ⊥. The graphs T ro and T s are also global variables which initially contain only the root node (IV, IV ὔ ). Other than them, all other variables are local, and they are initialized with ⊥. Query and round: Definitions. In Figure 3b , an arrow denotes a query. The submitter and receiver algorithms of a query are denoted by the rectangles attached to the head and the tail of the arrow. Fresh and old queries. The current short query can also be of two disjoint types: (1) an old query, which is already present in the relevant database (e.g., for G , when an adversary submits an s-query which is an intermediate ro-query of a previously submitted long query); or (2) a fresh query, which is so far not present in the relevant database.
Similarly, the current long query can also be old or fresh. If the output of the long query is computed using the existing elements of the (relevant) database, then it is old. If computation of the output requires at least one new invocation to a random oracle, then it is fresh.
Message block. In order to compare the time complexities of the oracles FWP, FWP and RO on a uniform scale, we recall the notion of a message block. A long query M -irrespective of the oracle -is assumed to be a sequence of k message blocks m , m , . . . , m k , where pad(M) = m m ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ m k . We shall note that, in the iterative computation of FWP(M) and FWP (M), every message block m i corresponds to an ro-query x‖m i for some bit-string x at the i-th iteration. However, it is not known how the message blocks are processed in RO(M). We assume that the RO processes the message blocks sequentially, and that the time taken to process a message block is equal for all FWP, FWP and RO.
Round (and query).
The time interval to process a short query or a message block is defined as a round. We assume that each round takes an equal amount of time. To simplify the analysis, henceforth, unless otherwise specified, a query would mean either a short query or a message block.
Rules of the game. An adversary never re-submits an identical long or s-query.
Suppose, ro : { , } ℓ+n → { , } n is a random oracle, and D is a finite set of pairs of the form (x, ro(x)).
Reconstructible message. From the high level, a bit-string M is a reconstructible message for the set D, if D contains all the ro-queries and responses (x, ro(x)), required to compute FWP ro (M) iteratively.
where
All y i and y ὔ i are n bits each; m i are ℓ bits each, except m k , which is an (ℓ − n)-bit string.
(Full) Reconstruction graph. Consider a weighted digraph T = (V, E), defined by a set of nodes V, and a set of weighted edges E. A weighted edge (v, w, v ὔ ) ∈ E is an ordered triple, such that v, v ὔ ∈ V, and w is the weight of the ordered pair (v, v ὔ ).
Definition 4.1 (Reconstruction graph). Suppose a weighted digraph T = (V, E)
is such that V is a set of n-bit strings, and, for all (a, b, c) ∈ E, the weight b is an ℓ-bit string. The graph T is called a reconstruction graph for D if, for every (y y ὔ , m , y y ὔ ) ∈ E, the following equation holds:
(y , y ὔ , y , and y ὔ are n bits each, and m is ℓ-bit), where (y m , ro(y m )) ∈ D. (An example of reconstruction graph is given in Figure 6 , which will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections.)
Thus, a reconstruction graph stores reconstructible messages on its branches. A full reconstruction graph stores all reconstructible messages. A branch B of a reconstruction graph T, rooted at y y Remark. Each fertile branch of a reconstruction graph corresponds to exactly one reconstructible message.
Definition 4.2 (Full reconstruction graph). A reconstruction graph T (for the set D) is full, if, for each reconstructible message M (for D), T contains a fertile branch B that corresponds to M.
View. Very loosely, the data structure view records the history of the interaction between a system and an adversary. Let x i and y i be the i-th query from the adversary and the corresponding response from the system. The view of the system after j queries is the sequence of queries and responses {(x y ), . . . , (x j y j )}.
Systems
The intuition behind our three-system construction is to compare the fixed FWP-mode to RO by considering a single hybrid system with an input/output distribution equal to that of FWP, and differing from RO only when one among a list of carefully specified events occurs. These systems are denoted G , G and G , respectively.
There are two specific benefits to the above methodology. First, considering a list of universal events instead of breaking the problem into a long series of games makes classification of the events into phases more apparent. This transparency leads to a natural definition of multi-phase versions of the hybrid game, as discussed in Section 10. Experiments show that these multi-phase versions may achieve an even higher indifferentiability bound, and if so, this technique may prove to be an important tool for deriving similar results for general modes.
The second benefit involves the connection between indifferentiability bounds, revealing information about the operation of the hash mode in an idealized model, and the practical security of hash modes utilizing fixed compression functions. Modeling the entire indifferentiability proof around a single filtration allows one to utilize more advanced measure theoretic tools to study the above connection as is done in [32] .
The main motivation guiding the construction of the hybrid system G is the difficulty of comparison between the executions of the systems G and G , instruction by instruction. The difficulty arises from the fact that the simulator in G must maintain a graph T s , and two extra subroutines FullGraph, and MessageRecon, while G has no such graphs or subroutines. To get around this difficulty, we reduce G to an equivalent system G by endowing it with additional memory for constructing the graph T ro , and by supplying it with additional subroutines MessageRecon and PartialGraph. These additional components do not result in any difference in the input and output distributions of the systems G and G for any adversary (this result is formalized in Proposition 5.1); therefore, in the indifferentiability framework, G can be replaced by G . The details of the constructions follow.
System G . Following the definition in Section 2.2, the system G implements the FWP mode using the random oracle ro : { , } ℓ+n → { , } n (see Figure 4 ). System G . See Figure 5 for the pseudocode. The random oracle RO (first mentioned in Section 3) is implemented using the same technique as used to build ro of system G ; however here the size of the array is arbitrary.
The simulator S. We first describe the two most important parts of the simulator S: the subroutines FullGraph and MessageRecon. See Figure 5 for the pseudocode. Building the graph T s using FullGraph(x, r, T s , D s ). This routine builds the full reconstruction graph T s without any node-collisions, using all the s-queries and responses stored in D s . Hence the name FullGraph. The description of the algorithm is in Figure 7 . The reconstruction graph T s is pictorially presented in Figure 6 . The algorithm on the ith query works in the following manner: First, all possible new edges are constructed (first three lines of Figure 7 ) and stored in E new . In E , we store only those edges of E new that can be connected to the existing graph T s . If the tail-nodes of E result in any node-collision in T s , then the execution stops. We follow the same process iteratively in a while loop until there are no more edges to add. It is easy to see that, on the ith query, the size of the vertex set |V| = O(i ), and therefore the while loop runs for O(i ) iterations. Since each iteration has O(i ) running time, the overall running time of FullGraph is O(i ). Now, if the adversary submits σ queries, then the time complexity of FullGraph is O(σ ). The time of FullGraph dominates over the other costs such as MessageRecon, and so the worst-case simulator time complexity of S will also be O(σ ).
Computing reconstructible messages M using MessageRecon(x, T s ). The graph T s is already a full reconstruction graph (without any node collision). Given the current s-query x, this subroutine derives the reconstructible message M, such that, in the iterative computation of FWP S (M), the final input to S is x, and all other intermediate inputs to S are old s-queries.
To determine such a message M, first, FindBranch(x, T s ) collects the sequence of message blocks M ὔ between the nodes (IV, IV ὔ ) and x[ , n − ]. The algorithm FindBranch is described in Figure 8 . Since the length of the sequence of message-blocks and the number of edges on the ith iteration are both O(i ), the running time of FindBranch for the ith iteration is O(i ).
Finally, MessageRecon returns the set {M = dePad(M ὔ ‖x[ n, ℓ + n − ])}. If no such M ̸ = ⊥ is found, then the subroutine returns the empty set.
With the definition of the above subroutines, we now describe how S responds to queries.
An s-query and response. For an s-query, the simulator S assigns a uniformly sampled n-bit value to r. Then the subroutine MessageRecon(x, T s ) is invoked that returns a set of reconstructible messages M. If |M| = , In the dashed box, it is shown how a current query-response is updated. y i y then the RO is invoked on M ∈ M, and the value is assigned to r[n, n − ]. Finally, the graph T s is updated by FullGraph, before r is returned.
Intermediate system G . See Figure 9 for the pseudocode. In our first description of this system, we will ignore the statements where the variable BAD is set, since they impact neither the output nor the global data structures. The variable BAD is set when certain events occur in the global data structures. Those events will be discussed in Section 6. We now describe the subroutines used by this system.
Building the graph T ro using PartialGraph(x, r, T ro ). This subroutine is called only when a fresh ro-query is produced. This subroutine updates the reconstruction graph T ro (for the set D ro ) in the following way: Rather than building all possible paths using elements of D ro , this routine augments the T ro in at most two phases; hence the name PartialGraph. The details are as follows. The subroutine ContactPoints(y c = x[ , n − ], T ro ) is invoked, which returns a set C containing all n-bit nodes in T ro , whose least-significant n bits are x[ , n − ]. We note that the nodes of T ro contained in C are the places where the fresh ro-query will be attached. The pictorial representation of T ro is in Figure 6 . 1st phase update: Using the members of the set C and the fresh query-response pair (x, r), fresh edges are constructed, stored in the set E, and then added to T ro using the subroutine AddEdge.
2nd phase update: In this phase, a second set of fresh nodes are added to the fresh nodes of the 1st phase, using all query-response pairs stored in table D ro . The details are as follows. If the least significant n bits of an old query x ∈ Dom(D ro ) equal the least significant n bits of the tail node of an edge e ∈ E, then a fresh edge is constructed as before, and then it is attached to the tail node of e using AddEdge. (x, T s ) . This subroutine has already been described in the context of G . However, in this context of G , there is an important point to note: The graph T s used by this subroutine is the maximally connected subgraph of T ro generated by the s-queries and responses with root (IV, IV ὔ ). The subroutine Extract(⋅) is used to derive the subgraph T s from the graph T ro . Now we describe how the oracles FWP and S respond to queries.
Constructing reconstructible M using MessageRecon
FWP . FWP mimics FWP, while updating the graph T ro using the subroutine PartialGraph, whenever a fresh ro-query is generated. First part of the main theorem. With the description of the systems at our disposal, we are well equipped to prove (3.2).
Proposition 5.1. For any distinguishing adversary A,
Proof. From the description of S , we observe that, for all x ∈ { , } ℓ+n , S (x) = ro(x). Likewise, from the description of FWP and FWP, for all M ∈ { , } * , FWP (M) = FWP(M).
6 Type0, 1, 2, and 3 of system G1
We recall that the adversary submits s-and long queries to the system G and receives responses, and based on the history of query-response pairs -known as the view -she then tries to distinguish G from G . Intuitively, those events are called 'bad', for which the outputs from the ro oracles of G can be predicted by the adversary with probability better than when interacting with G . These events primarily involve (a) various forms of collision occurring in the outputs of queries, allowing the adversary to generate non-trivial reconstructible messages. (b) Secondly, we need to catch the events where current queries match old queries too. One can intuit that these events may help the adversary in distinguishing G from G . (c) It is also important to note that, if T ro (and therefore T s of G ) is not a full reconstruction graph, then the adversary can also use this fact to compel G to produce outputs different from those from G (since G always maintains the full reconstruction graph T s ). (d) Lastly, the absence of 'bad' events will be able to restrict the growth of the reconstruction graph T ro every round to a constant number of nodes; this limits the number of reconstructible messages.
The next sections deal with concrete definitions of these events, keeping the above motivation in mind. Since the Type0 to Type3 events occur on ro-queries in G , we first need to concretely classify the ro-queries; such a classification, in turn, is based on different types of elements in D ro and different types of branch in T ro .
Classifying elements of D ro and branches of T ro
Elements of D ro : Six types. We classify the elements stored in D ro , according to its known and unknown parts. The known part of a ro-query and response is the part that is present in the view of the system G , or it can be derived from the view deterministically. The unknown part is not present in the view, and it cannot be derived from the view deterministically. There are six types of an old query-response denoted by Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 and Q6, as shown in Figure 10 (i) . The red and green circles denote the unknown and the known parts. The higher order bits are placed on the right.
In order to show there are only these six types, we observe from the (known and unknown parts of) l-and s-queries, and their responses that there are three types of output for an ro-query: (1) the least significant n bits are unknown (they are the outputs of the final ro-queries in l-queries); (2) all 2n bits are unknown (they are the outputs of the intermediate ro-queries in l-queries); (3) all n bits are known (they are the outputs of the s-queries). Note that in case (1), the output can be of three types of input (Q1, Q2 and Q5); any extra type of input for this output will require at least four types of output in total, which is impossible. Case (2) output can have two types of input (Q3 and Q4). Finally, for case (3), an output can have only one type of input (Q6).
The first five types were generated as the intermediate ro-queries and responses during the execution of old long queries. The sixth type is an old s-query and the response. We divide a Q5 query into two cases according to its position in T ro (depicted in Figure 12 ): (Q5-1) In a branch, all ro-queries preceding the Q5 query are of type Q6. (Q5-2) In a branch, there is at least one ro-query (preceding the Q5 query) which is not of type Q6. Figure 11 
Branches of T ro : Four types. The branches of T ro can be classified into four types, as shown in
The ro-queries: Seven types
We observe that -based on the types described in the sections above -the current ro-query can be categorized into the following classes. 1. Current ro-query is an s-query. This can be of two types.
a. The ro-query is fresh. b. The ro-query is one of six types of elements in D ro described in Section 6.1. 2. Current ro-query is an intermediate ro-query for the current long query. This is of three types.
a. Current long query is present on a red branch -as defined in Section 6.1 -of the graph T ro . The ro-query in this case is necessarily one of six types stored in D ro ; we divide it into two cases.
The ro-query is the final one.
The ro-query is a non-final one. b. Current long query is present on a green branch of the graph T ro . The ro-query in this case is also one of six types stored in D ro . c. Current long query is not present on a branch of the graph T ro . We divide the ro-query into two types.
(i) The ro-query is fresh.
The ro-query is one of six types of elements in D ro . Figure 10 . Pictorial description of Type2 and Type3 events of the system G described in Figure 9 . (i) Six types of a ro-query and response; (ii), (iii), and (iv) Type2 events of system G . The type Q5 in (iv) is divided into two subcases in Figure 12 . The l + n bits of query and n bits of response of the current query have been denoted by x and r in all cases. 
Definition: Type0 and Type1 on fresh queries
We address the classes 1a and 2c(i) of Section 6.2 together, since they are connected by the fact that the roquery is fresh. As described at the beginning of Section 6, for a fresh query, the absence of 'bad' events (1) prevents generation of non-trivial reconstructible messages, (2) (linearly) restricts the growth of the graph T ro , and (3) makes T ro a full reconstruction graph.
(1) A non-trivial reconstructible message is generated, (i) if the fresh ro-query causes a node collision in the graph T ro , or (ii) if it causes an old query to be attached to a fresh node. Type1-a, Type1-c, Type1-d and Type1-f events cover all the above conditions. See Figure 13b . (2) Absence of Type0, Type1-b, and Type1-d restricts the growth of the graph T ro to a constant number of nodes every fresh query (i.e., linearly after σ fresh queries). See Figures 13a and 13b.  ( 3) The goal of Type1-f -in addition to the one described in (1) -is that its absence makes T ro a full reconstruction graph after two phases.
Importance of the two-phase framework. The first novelty of our work lies in our carefully designed 'bad' events -especially the Type0 and Type1 events -that are spread across two phases. More precisely, the absence of these events allows the graph T ro to be augmented in two phases, rather than in one phase (see Figure 13) ; at the same time, it allows the graph to have the aforementioned properties. The two-phase framework -as we will see subsequently -is essential in breaking the birthday barrier of n/ bits. In a similar way, the two-phase framework could be extended to a three-phase framework to go even beyond n/ bits (see Section 10). But a rigorous theoretical analysis of that is a challenging task. Type0 event: Collision in outputs of ro. See Figure 13a . This event occurs if the right coordinate (or the most significant n bits) of the output of the ro-query is equal to the right coordinates of the outputs of two distinct old queries in D ro . The absence of this event ensures the following: Suppose a , a , a , . . . , a k are the final ro-queries for k distinct long queries, where a [n,
Then k is at most 2. This event will be used in Section 8 to bound the number of certain nodes in T ro .
Type1 event: Collision in T ro . See Figure 13b . Let (x, r) be the current fresh ro-query and response, such that x = y c ‖m, and r = y * ‖y ὔ . Let the edge (y c y ὔ c , m, yy ὔ ) be generated from (x, r). We define this event by partitioning it into six cases. Type1-a This event occurs if yy ὔ collides with a node already in T ro . Mathematically, this occurs if yy ὔ = v ∈ V. This collision can be used to generate at least two reconstructible messages in the next rounds -one of them can be used to distinguish G from G . Type1-b This event occurs if y collides with the already colliding left-coordinates (or the least-significant n bits) of two distinct nodes in T ro ; that is, these nodes together form a 3-multi-collision. More precisely, this is when y = a = c, where ab, cd ∈ V. The absence of this event -as we will see in Section 8 -bounds the new nodes added to T ro to a constant number every round. Type1-c This event occurs if yy ὔ collides with the least significant n bits of an old query stored in D ro , i.e., if yy ὔ = ab, where abc ∈ Dom(D ro ). Like before, this event can also be used to form a non-trivial reconstructible message in the next rounds. Type1-d This event occurs if y collides with the least significant n bits of an old query, and if the resulting node zz ὔ (added in Phase 2) collides with a node already in T ro . Note
Mathematically, the event occurs when the following conditions are met:
This collision can be used to generate at least two reconstructible messages in the next rounds. Type1-e This event occurs if y collides with the least significant n bits of an old query, and if the leftcoordinate z of the resulting node z‖z ὔ (added in Phase 2) collides with the left-coordinates of two distinct nodes already in T ro . Using our notation, this event happens when the following conditions occur:
Like Type1-b, the absence of this event bounds the new nodes added to T ro to a constant number in the next round. Type1-f This event occurs if y collides with the least significant n bits of an old query, and if the leftcoordinate z of the resulting node z‖z ὔ (added in Phase 2) collides with the least significant n bits of an old query. In other words, when the following conditions are satisfied:
The absence of this event serves two goals at the same time: (1) it rules out the generation of a non-trivial reconstructible message and (2) it restricts the growth of T ro only up to two phases every round.
Type2 and Type3 on old queries
Now we deal with the classes 1b, 2a, 2b and 2c(ii) of Section 6.2. All of them address the issue when the current queries match old ones.
The class 1b happens, when an s-query matches one of five types of old elements stored in D ro ; these events can potentially help the adversary in distinguishing between G and G , and we identify class 1b as Type2, and class 2a as Type3 events; the case by case analysis of the events will be given shortly.
The remaining classes are now 2a, 2b and 2c(ii), when the adversary submits a long query -say M -to the oracle FWP , and it is found that M is already present on some (fertile) branch of the graph T ro (2a and 2b), or it is not present at all on any branch of T ro (2c(ii)). The class 2c(ii) necessarily includes a fresh ro-query followed possibly by old ro-queries, and this scenario has already been considered in various forms of Type1 events.
It is clear that the classes 2a(ii) and 2b will not help the adversary in distinguishing G from G . So now we focus on the class 2a(i), which deals with the final ro-query of a red branch. Depending on the type of branch, the adversary tries to predict the most significant n bits of the final ro-query (i.e., the hash output) with non-trivial probability; she succeeds only for Type3 events that will be discussed shortly.
Type2.
Recall that a query-response pair in D ro can be of six types: Q1 to Q6. Type2 event is divided into several cases depending on the type of the current s-query. See Figure 10 (ii)-(iv) for the pictorial presentation. Suppose (x, r) is the input-output of a fresh query. Type2-a If the query is of type Q1. Type2-b If the query is of type Q2. Type2-c If the query is of type Q5-2. Type2-d If the query is of type Q3 and the adversary determines that the output is not from a random oracle. Type2-e If the query is of type Q4 and the adversary determines that the output is not from a random oracle. Type2-f If the query is of type Q5-1 and the adversary determines that the unknown output is not from a random oracle.
Type3. In this case, we consider the final ro-query of a red branch as the current query. Several types of red branch -(i), (ii), and (iii) -are shown in Figure 11 . There are three types of Type3 event:
Type3-a If the current long query M is present as a red branch of type (i). (Observe that this case implies a node-collision in T ro , since the y k− y ὔ k− m k is the final ro-query for two distinct l-queries, the current M and also an old one. Therefore, if Type1 event did not occur in the previous rounds, this event is impossible in the current round.) Type3-b If the current long query M is present as a red branch of type (ii), and the adversary determines that the most significant n bits of output is not from a random oracle. Type3-c If the current long query M is present as a red branch of type (iii).
GOOD and BAD event types
Events GOOD i and BAD i . BAD i denotes the event when the variable BAD is set during round i of G , that is, when Type0, Type 1, Type2, or Type3 events occur. Let the symbol GOOD i denote the event ¬ ⋁ i j= BAD i . The symbol GOOD denotes the event when no queries are submitted. We will show that if BAD i does not occur, and if GOOD i− did occur, then the views of G and G (after i rounds) are identically distributed for any attacker A.
Events GOOD i and BAD i . In order to get around a small technical difficulty in establishing the uniform probability distribution of certain random variables, we need to modify the above events GOOD i and BAD i slightly. The event BAD i occurs when Type0, Type2, or Type3 events occur in the i-th round. The event GOOD i is defined as GOOD i− ∧ ¬BAD i .
Second part of main theorem
With the help of the Type0 to Type3 events described in Section 6, we are equipped to prove (3.3) . Recall that we need to show two things:
as well as
The proof of (7.2) is straightforward. To prove (7.1), we proceed in the following way. Observe
If we can show that 4) then (7.3) reduces to (7.1), since
As a result, we focus on establishing (7.4). Let V i and V i denote the views of the systems G and G , respectively, after i queries have been processed. To prove (7.4) , it suffices to show that given GOOD σ , the views V σ and V σ are identically distributed. We do this by induction on the number of queries σ. Induction hypothesis. Given GOOD i , V i and V i are identically distributed.
Base. When i = , then no query has been made; therefore the hypothesis is true.
Induction step. Now assume the induction hypothesis holds. We have to show that if GOOD i+ occurred, then V i+ and V i+ are identically distributed.
Let (I i+ , O i+ ) and (I i+ , O i+ ) denote the input-output pairs for the systems G and G , respectively, in the i + st round.
A little reflection shows that proving the induction step is equivalent to proving the following proposition. 
Proof. (i) This result is easy since
(ii) First, we establish the following lemma which is the main ingredient in our proof.
Lemma 7.2. The reconstruction graphs T s of the systems G and G are isomorphic after i rounds, given GOOD
Proof. For each fresh ro-query, the graph T ro of system G is augmented in two phases (see Figure 9 ). In these two phases, all possible nodes are added to the graph T ro . An analysis of the Type1-a, c, d and f events show that if these events do not occur, then no nodes can be added beyond these two phases. In other words, if Type1-a, c, d and f events do not occur in i rounds, then the graph T ro contains all possible paths generated from all elements stored in the table D ro in i rounds with root (IV, IV ὔ ). Note that the graph T s is the maximally connected subgraph of T ro rooted at (IV, IV ὔ ), generated only by the s-queries and responses stored in D s . This implies that the graph T s of the system G contains all paths generated from all s-queries and responses with root (IV, IV ὔ ).
We note that the graph T s of G also contains all paths generated from all s-queries and responses with root (IV, IV ὔ ). As V i = V i , the graphs T s of G and G are isomorphic after i rounds.
Let I i+ denote the shared query input I i+ = I i+ . We continue by considering all possible cases based on a set of conditions for the system G in the i + st round; cases 1 through 9 consider when I i+ is an s-query, while cases 10 through 15 consider when I i+ is part of a long query. Our decision tree produced the above 15 cases, which have been derived from a sequence of questions (see Figure 16 ). The reader is invited to verify that all cases are considered. The case analysis along with the decision tree is provided in Appendix A.
A few combinatorial results
In order to prove the third part of the main theorem (equation (3.4) ), we will need a few combinatorial results. We first fix some notation.
• Node (i) : The multiset of nodes in T ro after i rounds in system G .
• N (i) (and N (i) ): The number of nodes added to T ro , during the 1st phase (and 2nd phase) of the i-th iteration of system G .
The number of nodes in T ro after i rounds, where the most significant n bits equal a.
contains all elements of A whose least significant n bits are equal to x. Such a sub-multiset will be called a left-coset of A, or simply a left-coset if A is clear from the context.
contains all elements of A whose most-significant n bits equal x. As above, we will call such a sub-multiset a right-coset of A, or simply a right-coset.
• twin-left and twin-right: A n-bit string a is a twin-left resp. twin-right of a n-bit string b, if
We now prove three important lemmas. The first one upper-bounds the size of the graph T ro , while the other two provide upper-bounds for the collision probability on the left and right coordinates of query-outputs and nodes on the graph.
Lemma 8.1 (Node counting). Given
right (a) ≤ for all a ∈ { , } n , and
Proof. Since GOOD i− occurred, the events Type0, Type1-b and Type1-e did not occur during the first i − rounds of system G . Therefore, the maximum size of the set Coset is 2 after i − rounds. (ii) In the second phase of the i-th round, a query cannot be added to more than 1 node of T ro , since the nodes generated during the first phase have distinct left-coordinates. As there are i queries, we get the result.
(iii) We note that, given GOOD i− occurred -which essentially implies that Type0 (or 3-multi-collision on the most significant n bits of the output of a query), Type1-b and Type1-e (3-multi-collision on the least significant n bits of a node) did not occur -in the first i − rounds. Therefore, one query can be placed in a maximum of two places on T ro , and at most two queries can have identical most significant n bits, implying the result.
(iv) We claim that the number of edges in T ro after i − rounds is at most i − . Suppose there were more than i − edges in T ro . This would require that we have at least one query which has been added to the graph at more than two nodes. However, this leads to a contradiction due to the fact that GOOD i− occurred. Namely, we have that events Type1-b and Type1-e did not occur. Now, since each edge has one tail node, including the root-node (IV, IV ὔ ), we get |Node
In the following two lemmas we will use this fact.
Lemma 8.2 (Left coordinate collision). The following inequality holds:
, and x ∈ { , } n .
Proof. We now label the elements of A = {y j x j | j = , , . . . , k}. We choose any pair y j x j and y j ὔ x j ὔ from A, with j ̸ = j ὔ and note that
We note that, if
Putting this result in (8.1), we get
Notice that P i lcc (y, A) is essentially the probability that the multiset A contains at least one twin-left of the node yx ∈ A, given GOOD i− occurred. Setting y x = yx ∈ A, we get
n (using (8.2)).
Lemma 8.3 (Right coordinate collision).
The following inequality holds:
where the multiset A = {x j y j | j = , , . . . , i − } contains the outputs of the previous i − ro-queries, and x ∈ { , } n .
Proof. We choose any pair x a y a and x b y b from A, with a ̸ = b and note that
where m and n are two previous ro-queries. Since m ̸ = n, we have
Notice that P i rcc (y, A) is essentially the probability that the multiset A contains at least one twin-right of a node xy ∈ A, given GOOD i− occurred. Without loss of generality, setting x y = xy ∈ A, we get
Third (or final) part of the main theorem
To prove (3.4), we need to individually compute the probabilities of Type0 i , Type1 i , Type2 i , and Type3 i events described in Section 6. The suffix i denotes the corresponding event in the round i.
Bounding the probability of Type0 i
The Type0 event is displayed in Figure 13a . The n-bit output of the ith ro-query -which is fresh -is denoted by y * 
Bounding the probability of Type1 i
We recall that if GOOD i− occurs, then
bound the probability of various Type1 events. The factor 2 on the left side of each inequality arises due to the two fresh nodes that can be added in the 1st phase. Several Type1 events are pictorially represented in Figure 13b .
Bounding the probability of Type1-a i . Let N denote the number of nodes in the graph T ro after i − full rounds and the 1st phase of round i, given GOOD i− occurred. Therefore,
It is straightforward to see from Figure 13b that
Bounding the probability of Type1-b i . Let a new node generated in the 1st phase of the i-th round be denoted by yy ὔ . Let A denote the multiset of all nodes added to the graph T ro up to the end of the 1st phase of the i-th round minus the node yy ὔ . Therefore, |A| ≤ |Node (i) | − = i. We label the elements of
Bounding the probability of Type1-c i . Since the maximum number of queries after i rounds is also i, from Figure 13b we see that
Bounding the probability of Type1-d i . We now define two events E and E as shown in Figure 13b . E denotes the event that the least-significant n bits of an old query are equal to the least-significant n bits of a fresh node -denoted by y -in the 1st phase. E denotes the event that the node zz ὔ -which is generated in the 2nd phase -is equal to two distinct nodes in the graph T ro . Since there are at most two fresh nodes in the 1st phase and there are at most i queries, we get
The last equality of (9.1) holds since E is independent of GOOD i− , E and E ∧ GOOD i− .
It is easy to see that Pr[E | GOOD i− ] = / n . Now we estimate Pr[E | GOOD i− ]. As denoted in Figure 13b (Type1-d) , the node zz ὔ has been generated by the query Old1. We observe that, given GOOD i− , the number of nodes, other than the node zz ὔ , generated from query Old1 in the graph T ro is at most 2 (otherwise, there is a 3-collision on the left-coordinates in T ro , which is prohibited by GOOD i− ). Similarly, given GOOD i− , the number of nodes generated from query Old2 -which is different from Old1 -is at most
Putting the above values in (9.1), we get
Bounding the probability of Type1-e i . As before, we define two events E and E as shown in Figure 13b .
The event E is defined identically as before; therefore, Pr[E | GOOD i− ] = / n . The event E occurs when z equals the least-significant n bits of two distinct nodes in the graph T ro . In other words, event E occurs if Left-Coset Node (i) (z) ≥ which is equivalent to the event ∃zy ∈ A ∧ Left-Coset A (z) ≥ where A = Node (i) \ {zz ὔ }. As before, E is independent of GOOD i− , E and E ∧ GOOD i− . Therefore,
Now, we estimate the following probability:
by Lemma 8.1. Using the above equation and (9.2), we finally estimate
Bounding the probability of Type1-f i . The event has been described in Figure 13b . The event E is the same as above. The event E occurs when z equals the least-significant n bits of a query. As in the previous case, E is independent of GOOD i− , E and E ∧ GOOD i− . Therefore,
Final summation. Adding all the previous constituent probabilities we obtain,
Bounding the probability of Type2 i
The following probabilities are easy to compute using the definition of Type2 events in Section 6.4.
Bounding the probability of Type2-a i . Note that a query of type Q1 is always the final ro-query for a long query; this implies that the middle n bits of such a query are the most-significant n bits of the output of another query. Since Type0 did not occur in the i − rounds, there can be at most two queries with outputs having identical most significant n bits; each of these queries can be attached to the graph in at most two places, since Type1-b or Type1-e did not occur in the first i − rounds. Therefore, the number of Q1 queries with identical middle n bits can be at most 4. Therefore,
Bounding the probability of Type2-b i . Since there can be at most i queries of type Q2,
Bounding the probability of Type2-c i . Note that there can be at most one query of type Q5-2 with identical ℓ + n bits of input. Also note that the Q5-2 query is the final query of one branch -call it B -as shown in Figure 12 . Now, we see that the branch B has at least one of Q1 to Q5 queries, followed by a Q5 or a Q6 query. Therefore,
Bounding the probability of Type2-d i . Let E denote the event that the current query is type Q3, and let E denote the event that the adversary determines that the output is not that of a random oracle. Now
since information theoretically there is no mechanism for determining the distribution from which the particular output was chosen.
Bounding the probability of Type2-e i . Let E denote the event that the current query is type Q4, and let E denote the event that the adversary determines that the output is not that of a random oracle. Now Type2-e = E ∧ E . Therefore,
for the same reason as above.
Bounding the probability of Type2-f i . Let E denote the event that the current query is type Q5-1, and let E denote the event that the adversary determines that the least significant n bits of output are not that of a random oracle. Now Type2-f = E ∧ E . Therefore,
Final summation. Adding all the previous constituent probabilities, we obtain
Bounding the probability of Type3 i
Examining the definition of Type3 events in the following results can be established.
Bounding the probability of Type3-a i . This event cannot occur -as observed in Section 6.4 -if Type1 event did not occur in the first i − rounds. Therefore,
Bounding the probability of Type3-b i . From the definition in Section 6.4,
Bounding the probability of Type3-c i . From the definition in Section 6.4,
Final step
We prove (3.4) by combining the above bounds in the following inequality which holds for ≤ i ≤ σ:
Experimental results: The bound improves towards n bits
We performed a series of experiments studying the effects of the bad events in our theoretical framework. Our simple C implementation of the game G simulated the random oracle, ro, with randomness supplied by rand(), by maintaining a database of input/output pairs, assuring that ro commits to an output while allowing fresh queries to remain independent of all past events. We collected data providing accurate estimates for the values Pr[Type1 i | GOOD i− ] described in Section 6. Compiling these data, we computed the relative percentage of several Type1 events. The results are provided in Table 2 . The experimental results strongly agree with the bounds computed in Section 9.
In addition to these event probabilities, we calculated security bounds for several values of n. The computation was achieved by randomly generating a large number of graphs, T ro , and determining the number of queries, σ, required to cause ∑ Figure 14 . Naturally, the data follow the theoretically obtained bound of σ = Ω( n/ ) (see Theorem 3.1). Some of the values in the graph are slightly lower than / , due to the effect of constants. The data asymptotically approach / .
We did not consider the Type2 and Type3 events, since, for any efficient adversary the probabilities of these events are dominated by that of the Type1 events. We found that choosing the values at which to place the 1st query uniformly at random from among all possible maximal left-cosets was the most advantageous strategy for an adversary.
Hoping that the real indifferentiability security bound is more than n/ -bit, we experimented with a smaller set of 'bad' events than the ones described in Section 6. We first removed the 'artificial' Type1-b, Type1-e, and Type0 events; it is easy to see that (3.2) and (3.3) can be proved without these events. These Table 2 . The relative percentage of Type1 bad events for various values of n. Columns 6-9, 10-11, and 12 were computed by generating 100 000, 10 000, and 5000 trees, T ro , respectively. Figure 14 . Plot of experimental data of value of n versus the normalized logarithm of σ, log (σ)/n, for the systems "2-phase G " (or simply G ) and "multi-phase G " (labeled by G1 ὔ ).
events were inserted so that it is mathematically easier to derive the bounds on the size of the graph T ro (see Section 8) . It is our intuition that a cleverer mathematician will be able to obtain similar bounds even without these 'artificial' events. Then we have switched from the two-phase framework to a natural extension of three-phase (or multi-phase) framework. In short, with the construction of a multi-phase version of the game G , removing the artificial Type1-b, Type1-e, and Type0 events, we see that the normalized logarithm of σ increases towards one as n increases. The Type1 events of the three-phase version of G are illustrated in Figure 15 . These data indicate that the bound may be significantly improved, possibly even to nearly n bits, as reflected in the red line of Figure 14 . Although considering m-multicollision (where m > ) would lower the probability of occurrence of Type1-b and Type1-e events significantly, we note the overall bound could not be improved since (at the ith query) Type1-f would still occur with probability O(i / n ). This quantity will still keep the overall bound at n/ bits. The only way to improve the bound seems to be using more levels than just two, as discussed previously.
Conclusion and open problems
Indifferentiability security guarantees absence of all generic attacks. In this paper we improved the indifferentiability security bound of the FWP hash mode from n/ to n/ bits. Many popular hash modes use primitives of the form C : { , } n → { , } n . For such an important family, the FWP becomes the only mode Figure 15 . The Type1 events of the 3-phase version of the system G . to achieve indifferentiable security of more than n/ bits. Secondly, among n-bit hash modes with a > n, the FWP mode has the highest rate among all modes which have beyond-birthday-barrier security. Our experimental results strongly indicate that the bound could be further improved, possibly even close to n bits. In addition, our proof technique is novel, and it uses only three games with a set of specially designed bad events.
Our work leaves room for more research. The security upper-bound for the FWP is n-bit, while the proven lower-bound is n-bit. One research direction would be to close the gap between these upper and lower bounds. Also, one may try to optimize the complexity of the simulator running time. Case 11: Long query, final block, long query not in T ro . Implication. Let M be the long query in question. Since the event GOOD i+ implies that Type1 did not occur in the previous i rounds of G , there are no nodecollisions in the graph T ro . Therefore, the final ro-query is fresh, implying O i+ follows the uniform distribution U[ , n − ]. As before, the tables D l in both systems were identical when the long query M was submitted; therefore, at that time of submission, M ∉ Dom(D l ) for both the systems. This ensures that O i+ = RO(M) follows the uniform distribution U[ , n − ].
